

U.S. Department of Homeland Security
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Washington, DC 20529



**U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services**

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FILE: EAC 03 028 54164

Office: VERMONT SERVICE CENTER

Date: **NOV 15 2005**

IN RE:

Petitioner:

Beneficiary:

PETITION:

Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker as a Member of the Professions Holding an Advanced Degree or an Alien of Exceptional Ability Pursuant to Section 203(b)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(2)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:

SELF-REPRESENTED

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Robert P. Wiemann".

Robert P. Wiemann, Director
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The preference visa petition was denied by the Director, Vermont Service Center, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The petitioner is a clothes factory. It seeks to employ the beneficiary permanently in the United States as a fashion designer pursuant to section 203(b)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(2). In pertinent part, section 203(b)(2) of the Act provides immigrant classification to members of the professions holding advanced degrees or their equivalent and whose services are sought by an employer in the United States. As required by statute, the petition was accompanied by certification from the Department of Labor. The director determined that the petitioner had not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage beginning on the priority date of the visa petition and denied the petition accordingly. The director further determined that the petitioner had not established that the beneficiary met the job requirements set forth on the labor certification.

On appeal, counsel submits a brief and additional evidence.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) states, in pertinent part:

Ability of prospective employer to pay wage. Any petition filed by or for an employment-based immigrant which requires an offer of employment must be accompanied by evidence that the prospective United States employer has the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner must demonstrate this ability at the time the priority date is established and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. Evidence of this ability shall be in the form of copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements.

The petitioner must demonstrate the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, the day the Form ETA 750 was accepted for processing by any office within the employment system of the Department of Labor. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(d). Here, the Form ETA 750 was accepted for processing on January 8, 1998. The proffered wage as stated on the Form ETA 750 is \$21.77 per hour, which amounts to \$45,281.60 annually. On the Form ETA 750B, signed by the beneficiary, the beneficiary did not claim to have worked for the petitioner.

On the petition, the petitioner claimed to have been established in May 1995, to have a gross annual income of \$250,000, to have a “variable” net annual income and to currently employ 12 workers. In support of the petition, the petitioner submitted the labor certification.

Because the director deemed the evidence submitted insufficient to demonstrate the petitioner’s continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, on December 15, 2004, the director requested additional evidence pertinent to that ability. In accordance with 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2), the director specifically requested that the petitioner provide copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements to demonstrate its continuing ability to pay the proffered wage for 1998. In accordance with 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(1) and 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(k)(3)(B), the director also requested evidence of the beneficiary’s qualifications for the job. The director sent the request to prior counsel.

In response, prior counsel asserted that he no longer represented the petitioner but that he had forwarded the director's notice to the petitioner at the last known address. The record does not reflect that the petitioner has moved since filing the petition.

On March 21, 2005, the director denied the petition, asserting that the director had failed to submit the requested documentation.

On appeal, the petitioner asserts that all of the requested information was provided to the Department of Labor in support of the application for labor certification. As quoted above, 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) requires the submission of evidence of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. Moreover, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(k)(3) requires evidence of the beneficiary's qualifications. *See also, Mandany v. Smith*, 696 F.2d 1008, (D.C. Cir. 1983); *K.R.K. Irvine, Inc. v. Landon*, 699 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir. 1983). Thus, the assertion that the evidence was submitted in support of the labor certification does not overcome the fact that this evidence is required in support of the visa petition.

The petitioner submits evidence that the petitioner does meet the job requirements set forth on the labor certification. As such, the petitioner has overcome that portion of the director's denial. The petitioner also submits its 1998 U.S. Corporation Income Tax Return with the following information:

Net income	\$8,010 (before net operating loss deduction.)
Current Assets	\$10,344
Current Liabilities	\$3,711
Net current assets	\$6,633

In determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage during a given period, Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) will first examine whether the petitioner employed and paid the beneficiary during that period. If the petitioner establishes by documentary evidence that it employed the beneficiary at a salary equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the evidence will be considered *prima facie* proof of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. In the instant case, the petitioner did not establish that it employed and paid the beneficiary any wages in 1998.

If the petitioner does not establish that it employed and paid the beneficiary an amount at least equal to the proffered wage during that period, CIS will next examine the net income figure reflected on the petitioner's federal income tax return, without consideration of depreciation or other expenses. Reliance on federal income tax returns as a basis for determining a petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is well established by judicial precedent. *Elatos Restaurant Corp. v. Sava*, 632 F. Supp. 1049, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (citing *Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v. Feldman*, 736 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1984)); *see also Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh*, 719 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Texas 1989); *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); *Ubeda v. Palmer*, 539 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Ill. 1982), *aff'd*, 703 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1983). Showing that the petitioner's gross receipts exceeded the proffered wage is insufficient. Similarly, showing that the petitioner paid wages in excess of the proffered wage is insufficient. In *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. at 1084, the court held that the Immigration and Naturalization Service, now CIS, had properly relied on the petitioner's net income figure, as stated on the petitioner's corporate income tax returns, rather than the petitioner's gross income. The court specifically rejected the argument that the Service should have considered income before expenses were paid rather than net income.

Nevertheless, the petitioner's net income is not the only statistic that can be used to demonstrate a petitioner's ability to pay a proffered wage. If the net income the petitioner demonstrates it had available during that period, if any, added to the wages paid to the beneficiary during the period, if any, do not equal the amount of the proffered wage or more, CIS will review the petitioner's assets. We reject, however, any argument that the petitioner's total assets should have been considered in the determination of the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner's total assets include depreciable assets that the petitioner uses in its business. Those depreciable assets will not be converted to cash during the ordinary course of business and will not, therefore, become funds available to pay the proffered wage. Further, the petitioner's total assets must be balanced by the petitioner's liabilities. Otherwise, they cannot properly be considered in the determination of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. Rather, CIS will consider *net current assets* as an alternative method of demonstrating the ability to pay the proffered wage.

Net current assets are the difference between the petitioner's current assets and current liabilities.¹ A corporation's year-end current assets are shown on Schedule L, lines 1(d) through 6(d). Its year-end current liabilities are shown on lines 16(d) through 18(d). If a corporation's end-of-year net current assets are equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the petitioner is expected to be able to pay the proffered wage out of those net current assets.

The petitioner has not demonstrated that it paid any wages to the beneficiary during 1998. In 1998, the petitioner shows a net income of only \$8,010 and net current assets of only \$6,633. The petitioner has not, therefore, demonstrated the ability to pay the proffered wage out of its net income or net current assets. The petitioner has not demonstrated that any other funds were available to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner has not, therefore, shown the ability to pay the proffered wage during 1998.

While not requested by the director, the regulation quoted above requires evidence of ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date and continuing. The record contains none of the initial evidence required under the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) for any year after 1998. Therefore, the petitioner has not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date and continuing.

Beyond the decision of the director, the petitioner has not demonstrated that the job offered requires an advanced degree professional or an alien of exceptional ability. An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by the AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. *See Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States*, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), *aff'd* 345 F.3d 683 (9th Cir. 2003); *see also Dor v. INS*, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989)(noting that the AAO reviews appeals on a *de novo* basis).

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(k)(4)(i) provides, in pertinent part:

¹ According to *Barron's Dictionary of Accounting Terms* 117 (3rd ed. 2000), "current assets" consist of items having (in most cases) a life of one year or less, such as cash, marketable securities, inventory and prepaid expenses. "Current liabilities" are obligations payable (in most cases) within one year, such accounts payable, short-term notes payable, and accrued expenses (such as taxes and salaries). *Id.* at 118.

The job offer portion of the individual labor certification, Schedule A application, or Pilot Program application must demonstrate that the job requires a professional holding an advanced degree or the equivalent or an alien of exceptional ability.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(k)(2) permits the following substitution for an advanced degree:

A United States baccalaureate degree or a foreign equivalent degree followed by at least five years of progressive experience in the specialty shall be considered the equivalent of a master's degree.

It is important that the ETA-750 be read as a whole. Block 14 on the ETA-750 Part A contained in the record contains the following information:

Education – College: “4,” Degree Required: “Any College Degree” in “Any Field.”

Experience – “2” years in job offered or “4” years in a related occupation.

Block 15 includes no additional language. As the job described on the labor certification does not require at least a bachelor's degree plus five years of experience, the job does not require an advanced degree professional.

For the above stated reasons, considered both in sum and as separate grounds for denial, the petition may not be approved. The burden of proof in these proceedings rests solely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. The petitioner has not met that burden.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.